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Abstract 
 
A change in a country’s minimum wage will in general affect the number of workers in covered 
sector employment, uncovered sector employment, and unemployment. The impact of these labor 
market adjustments on absolute poverty will depend on how the pattern of employment 
composition changes within households and on how income is shared within households. An 
earlier paper (Fields and Kanbur, 2007) focused on the income-sharing dimension of the problem. 
The present paper focuses on household employment composition. For a particular structure of 
the labor market— one with good jobs, bad jobs, unemployment, and adult and youth workers— 
and with a particular model of how the sectoral patterns of employment are translated into 
household employment composition, we analyze the impact of minimum wages on a class of 
absolute poverty measures. The precise characterizations demonstrate the need for a nuanced 
appreciation of the impacts of a minimum wage increase, since they depend intricately on the 
values of key parameters (the poverty line, poverty aversion, labor demand elasticity, and the 
starting level of the minimum wage). Moreover, the relationship between poverty and the 
minimum wage is in general non-monotonic, so that local effects can be quite different from the 
effects of large changes in the minimum wage.
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Convention of the Society of 
Labor Economists, Chicago, IL, May, 2007. 
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Poverty Effects of the Minimum Wage: The Role of Household Employment Composition 
 
Gary S. Fields (gsf2@cornell.edu) 
Baran Han (bh84@cornell.edu)  
Ravi Kanbur (sk145@cornell.edu)  
 
I.  Introduction 
Minimum wages are commonly evaluated by labor economists in one of two ways. Some 
analysts pay primary attention to the fact that a higher minimum wage increases the labor market 
earnings of those employed, while others emphasize that a higher minimum wage would normally 
be expected to reduce the number employed (Brown, 1999; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006; 
Borjas,2005). However, an analysis of the effects of these labor market consequences on poverty, 
which is the ultimate focus of much of the policy discourse, requires two further steps. First, the 
employment composition of the labor market has to be translated into the employment 
composition of each household. Second, a method of income sharing within the household must 
be specified.  
In a previous paper (Fields and Kanbur, 2007), in a model with only two types of workers 
- employed and unemployed - we focused primarily on different ways that incomes might be 
shared within households and how each affected the impact of minimum wages on poverty. In the 
present paper we assume perfectly equal income sharing within the household, and focus instead 
on employment composition. We develop the household distribution of income from the labor 
market outcomes for a model with good jobs, bad jobs and unemployment, and adults and youths 
searching for jobs. Such a structure allows us, for example, to incorporate the fact that in 
countries such as the United States, many minimum wage workers live in non-poor households 
(Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg, 2000). The impact of a minimum wage on poverty then 
depends crucially on the employment composition of households at different levels of income. 
We ask, when exactly does a higher minimum wage raise poverty, when does it lower poverty, 
and when is poverty unchanged?  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the main features 
of the model. Section III derives the effect of a small increase in the minimum wage. Section IV 
extends the analysis to large changes in the minimum wage. Section V summarizes and concludes. 
 
II.  The Model 
A. The Labor Market and Household Employment Composition 
In this paper, it is assumed that there is a fixed number of households, normalized at 1. 
Each household consists of two household members: one adult and one youth. Thus, the total 
labor supply is 2.  
The labor market has two types of jobs. High wage jobs, h, pay a wage  . The wage of 
these “good jobs” is assumed to be invariant to any changes taking place elsewhere in the labor 
market. Employment in the high wage sector, denoted xh, is determined according to a standard 
downward-sloping labor demand curve xh = f( ), f'<0. Low wage jobs, l, pay a minimum wage 
, which is determined as a matter of public policy. Employment in these “bad jobs” in the low 
wage sector is also determined according to a standard downward-sloping labor demand curve xl 
= g( ), g’<0. It is assumed that only adults can be employed in the high wage sector. Adults 
who fail to find employment in the high wage sector, together with youths, form an 
undifferentiated pool of applicants for low wage jobs. 
hw
hwˆ
lwˆ
lwˆ
The low wage  is of course less than the high wage , and households in which both 
members are employed earn more than households in which only one is employed. In addition, 
we assume that the low wage is greater than half the high wage. Together, these assumptions 
imply that  
lwˆ hw
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< . 
These inequalities will be maintained throughout this paper.  
We now discuss the number of persons earning each of these amounts and the per capita 
household incomes. Employment in the high wage and low wage sectors are respectively  and 
. Given that the high wage sector employs only adults, the number of whom is normalized at 1, 
hx
lx
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the number of adults seeking low wage jobs is )1( hx− . In addition, all youth (the number of 
which is normalized at 1) also seek low wage jobs. Thus, the number of applicants for low wage 
jobs is , and the probability that a low wage applicant gets a job is hx−2
h
l
x
x
−2 . An adult can be 
employed in a high wage job with probability , employed in a low wage job with 
probability
hx
)
2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− , or unemployed with probability )21)(1( h
l
h x
xx −−− .  A youth can 
be employed in a low wage job with probability 
h
l
x
x
−2  or unemployed with 
probability )
2
1(
h
l
x
x
−− .  Putting these respective wages and employment probabilities together, 
we have six possible types of households, where Ai, i = h, l, u is the employment state of the adult 
and  
Yj, j=l, u is the employment state of the youth; see Table 1. All household members are assumed 
to share their earnings. Hence household earnings per capita is the relevant measure of the well-
being of each individual in the household. Clearly the poorest individuals are those who live in 
households where nobody works (H6). Next come individuals in households where one member 
is unemployed but the other member is employed  in the  minimum wage sector (H4 and H5).  
Given our assumption that the high wage is less than twice the low wage, the case where the adult 
has a high wage job but the youth is unemployed (H3) gives lower per capita income than the 
case where both the adult and the youth are employed in the low wage sector (H2).  Finally, the 
highest household per capita income occurs when the adult has a good job and the youth is 
employed in the minimum wage sector (H1). Table 1 sets out, therefore, the income distribution 
in this society. We turn now to the measurement of poverty based on this income distribution. 
 
B. How Poverty Is Measured 
Poverty in this paper is measured in absolute terms. The analysis consists of determining 
how poverty in the labor market varies with changes in . Poverty is gauged by comparing the 
household’s labor market earnings to a fixed poverty line z. The poverty line is $z per person, i.e., 
$2z per household. 
lwˆ
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How high the fixed poverty line is itself allowed to vary. Five cases are analyzed in this 
paper. Moving from the lowest poverty line to the highest, they are:  
Case 1: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwwz +<<<<<   
Case 2: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwzw +<<<<<   
Case 3: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwzww +<<<<<   
Case 4: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwzwww +<<<<<  
Case 5: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 zwwwww hllhl <+<<<<  
Case 1 is where the poverty line is so low that only households with all members 
unemployed are poor. Case 2 brings into the poverty net those households where one member is 
unemployed but the other member has a minimum wage job. These households will benefit from 
a rise in the minimum wage if they hold onto the minimum wage job. Case 3 widens the poverty 
net still further to include households where the adult is employed in the high wage sector but the 
youth is unemployed. Case 4 sets the poverty line at a sufficiently high level that income from 
two minimum wage jobs is not enough to pull the household out of poverty. Finally, Case 5 is the 
extreme case where the poverty line is so high that everybody is in poverty. Observers who argue 
that the minimum wage does not target poverty very well are clearly thinking of Cases 1 through 
through 4, in which non-poor households have minimum wage earners. But in Cases 2 through 5, 
poor households also have minimum wage workers. Hence in Cases 2, 3 and 4, minimum wage 
workers are to be found in both poor and non-poor households. 
 In all cases, poverty is gauged using the class of absolute poverty indices developed by 
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). The FGT index, denoted Pα, takes each poor person's 
poverty deficit as a percentage of the poverty line, raises it to a power α, and averages over the 
entire population.  Letting yi be the income of the i-th person, z the poverty line, q the number of 
poor persons, and n the total number of persons, the Pα  poverty measure is given by: 
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α
α ∑
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
q
i
i
z
yz
n
P
1
1
. (1) 
 Three specific values of α are of particular interest. As is well known, when α = 0 this 
measure collapses to the headcount ratio, the fraction of people below the poverty line. Other 
interesting values of α are when α is greater than or equal to one. Benchmark values in this range 
are α = 1, in which case we have the income gap measure of poverty, and α = 2, which is known 
as the squared poverty gap measure. The higher is α, the greater is the sensitivity of poverty to 
changes in the incomes of the poorest compared to the incomes of the not so poor. For these 
reasons, α  is known as the poverty aversion parameter. To allow for the social loss from poverty 
to increase at an increasing rate as incomes fall relative to the poverty line, α  must be greater 
than 1. Because of the intuitive appeal of integer values of α, it is common for empirical poverty 
researchers to choose α = 2.  Different degrees of poverty aversion will be seen to be important in 
delineating the consequences of the minimum wage for poverty. 
  We turn now to the poverty effects of higher minimum wages in this model. 
 
III.  The Poverty Effects of  a Higher Minimum Wage Within Each of the Five Cases 
We have set forth five cases above. For each of these five cases, different types of 
tradeoffs are involved in raising the minimum wage. The results are summarized in Table 2. The 
detailed derivations are given in the Appendix 1. Here we will provide an intuitive discussion of 
the results. The results fall into three groups and will be discussed accordingly: 1) The results for 
α = 0, in which 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 2) The results for Case 1, also in which 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 3) The results for α 
> 1 in Cases 2 through 5, in which   0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0) if the elasticity of labor demand in the 
minimum wage sector η is sufficiently high (low). 
 The first set of results (for α = 0) can be understood in a similar way for all five cases. 
When α = 0, the poverty measure being used is the poverty headcount ratio. A higher minimum 
wage causes more people to become unemployed, which raises the number of households in 
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poverty, i.e., 0
ˆ
0 >
lwd
dP
. Given that the P0 poverty measure focuses only on the numbers in 
poverty and not on how poor the poor are, the gains to the incomes of poor working households is 
not counted, and poverty (measured by the number in poverty) always rises. The only reason that 
0
ˆ
0 =
lwd
dP
(in Case 5) is that the poverty line is so high that everybody is in poverty to begin with, 
and so no further increase in poverty is possible.  
 The second set of results is for Case 1, i.e., the case in which the only poor households 
are those for which both household members are unemployed. Thus an increase in the minimum 
wage cannot possibly affect their incomes, but their numbers will increase with the rise in 
unemployment. Thus, no matter what the value of α, in this case, an increase in the minimum 
wage will increase poverty, i.e., 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 
 The third set of results is for α > 1 in Cases 2 through 5. In each of these cells, 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα when η  is sufficiently high and 0
ˆ
<
lwd
dPα when η  is sufficiently low. That is, when the 
elasticity of labor demand is greater than the critical value corresponding to that particular case, 
as the minimum wage increases, poverty will increase. Poverty will rise when the unemployment 
effect of a minimum wage increase dominates the earnings effect. Of course, this is more likely 
the greater the elasticity of demand for labor. On the other hand, when the elasticity of labor 
demand is less than the critical value, as the minimum wage increases, poverty will decrease: the 
earnings effect dominates the unemployment effect. 
 This completes our analysis of how poverty changes locally with the minimum wage 
within each of the five cases. Let us now analyze what happens when changes in the minimum 
wage are so large that we move across cases. 
 
IV.  The Poverty Effects of a Large Increase in the Minimum Wage 
 Section III analyzed the effects of an infinitesimal increase in the minimum wage. In this 
section, we ask what happens if the minimum is increased discretely. On the one hand, the 
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discrete jump in the minimum wage can occur within a case. When this happens, the effect of the 
minimum wage on poverty is the integral of all the infinitesimal changes. No new analysis is 
needed when this happens. On the other hand, the discrete jump in the minimum wage can cause 
the economy to switch from one case to another. We show in this section that when such a switch 
occurs, the change in poverty may be discontinuous and, moreover, may go in the opposite 
direction from what happens on either side of the discontinuity. 
 
 A. Two Examples 
It is possible to gain further insights by looking at specific numerical examples. These 
examples will then be used to derive more general results.  
The two examples we present are similar in most respects. They have the same high 
wage , the same employment at the high wage15ˆ =hw 1.0=hx , the same range of possible 
minimum wages (from 
2
ˆ hw = 7.5 to = 15), the same constant elasticity of demand for labor in 
the low wage sector  
hwˆ
η = 0.7, and the same demand for labor curve in the low wage 
sector . The two examples differ in one important respect, however: in 
Example 1, the poverty line z is in the range 
ll wx ˆln7.03.0 −=
,
2
hwz < while in Example 2, the poverty line z is in 
the range .
2
hwz >  (Note: In Cases 1 and 2, ,
2
hwz <  while in Cases 3 through 5, .
2
hwz > ) For 
the calculations below, z = 5 in Example 1 and 12.5 in Example 2. 
 To analyze how poverty as measured by Pα changes with ,
ˆ
z
wl our strategy is to fix z and 
raise from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value. We do this first when lwˆ
2
hwz < and then when 
2
hwz > . 
 
 B.  Analysis for the Poverty Headcount Ratio (α = 0) 
 We start with the situation where α is chosen to equal 0, i.e., the poverty measure is the 
headcount ratio. The headcount ratio is sensitive only to the number of people below the poverty 
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line but not to the severity of their poverty. This means that changing the minimum wage induces 
only an unemployment effect but no earnings effect.  
When Pα = 0, the unemployment effect operates in the same way in Cases 1 through 4: an 
increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the low wage sector, thereby increasing 
poverty as long as we remain within any of these four cases. In Case 5, however, everyone is poor 
and remains so, and therefore a change in the minimum wage has no effect on the poverty 
headcount. 
 What happens within a case is not the same as what happens in moving from one case to 
the next. To illustrate this point, consider Figures 1 and 2. 
 Figure 1 graphs the poverty headcount ratio P0 in Example 1. We see that P0 increases as 
the minimum wage rises within Case 2. However, there is a discontinuous fall in P0 at = 10. 
Why 10? Because that is twice the poverty line (5 in Example 1), which is the boundary between 
Case 2 and Case 1. When the minimum wage rises above 10, all of the people living in 
households with just one member employed at the minimum wage suddenly escape from poverty. 
We are now in the range of Case 1. In that range, a further increase of the minimum wage 
decreases employment and therefore raises the poverty headcount. This range ends just before the 
minimum wage equals the high wage, i.e., as   
lwˆ
.ˆ hl ww →
 Suppose we continue to maintain that 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<<  but now
2
hwz > . 
These conditions hold in Example 2. Figure 2 graphs the poverty headcount ratio P0 in Example 2. 
The figure shows that as the minimum wage rises, P0 is constant (at 1) in Case 5 and increases 
within Cases 4 and 3. It also shows discontinuous drops at the boundaries of the Cases. The 
reason is analogous to Example 1. At the boundary between Cases 5 and 4, all of the households 
with the maximum possible earnings – that is, those in which the adult is employed in a high 
wage job and the youth in a low wage job – suddenly escape poverty. Similarly, at the boundary 
between Cases 4 and 3, those households in which both the adult and the youth are employed in 
low wage jobs suddenly escape poverty. 
 These examples illustrate results that are quite general:  
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Proposition 1: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< and 
2
hwz < , an increase 
in the minimum wage raises P0 within a case but may lower P0 if the economy 
crosses from Case 2 to Case 1. 
 
Proof: In Appendix 2 
 
Turning now to the case exemplified by Figure 2, we have the following general result: 
 
Proposition 2: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< and 
2
hwz > , an increase 
in the minimum wage leaves P0  unchanged if the minimum wage remains within 
Case 5, raises P0 if the minimum wage remains within Case 4 or Case 3, and may 
lower P0 if the economy crosses from Case 5 to Case 4 or from Case 4 to Case 3. 
 
Proof: In Appendix 2| 
 
This completes our analysis of how the poverty headcount ratio P0 varies with the 
minimum wage  We turn now to the analysis of the situation where poverty is measured by 
the squared poverty gap P2. 
.ˆ lw
 
 C.  Analysis for the Squared Poverty Gap (α = 2) 
The squared poverty gap P2 is sensitive both to the number of people below the poverty 
line and to the severity of their poverty. Changing the minimum wage will induce both an 
unemployment effect and an earnings effect. As detailed in Section III, poverty as measured by 
P2 may increase or decrease depending on the relative size of these two effects. 
Figure 3 graphs the squared poverty gap P2 in Example 1. In this particular example, as 
the minimum wage increases, P2 increases in both Cases 2 and 1. This is not a general result: P2 
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could be increasing, decreasing, or change sign within either of the two Cases. Figure 4 graphs 
the squared poverty gap P2 in Example 2. In this particular example, we have a U-shaped pattern: 
as the minimum wage increases, P2 decreases in Case 5, decreases and then increases in Case 4, 
and increases throughout Case 3. This U shape is not a general result: P2 could be decreasing 
throughout, increasing throughout, or change sign depending on parameter values. The general 
result is: 
 
Proposition 3: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< , P2 is a continuous 
function of the minimum wage  .ˆ lw
 
Proof: In Appendix 2 
 
Although the behavior of P2 with respect to the minimum wage is continuous, it 
can be non-monotonic, as shown in Figure 4. This once again means that local findings, 
whether theoretical or empirical, are not necessarily a good guide to the implications of 
discrete changes. Thus, in Figure 4, while a small increase in the minimum wage for low 
values of the wage may lower poverty, a sufficiently large increase may have the 
opposite effect. On the other hand, just because an increase in the minimum wage from a 
particular starting point is observed to increase poverty is no guarantee that an increase in 
the minimum wage will have the same effect as an increase in the minimum wage from 
some other starting point. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 Fields and Kanbur (2007) brought the issue of income-sharing within the household to 
the forefront of the debate on the poverty impact of minimum wages. That paper showed how this 
poverty impact depends crucially on the income-sharing rule.  
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In this paper, the following model has been used. We have assumed equal sharing within 
the household to highlight the importance of the household employment composition. Each 
household consists of one adult and one youth. There are two types of jobs, high wage jobs and 
low wage jobs. The minimum wage applies to low wage jobs. Only adults may be hired for the 
high wage jobs. Those adults not hired for the high wage jobs and all youth compete for the low 
wage jobs. Of these, the ones not hired in the low wage jobs are unemployed. This structure 
determines the employment composition of each household, which in turn determines its income. 
A household is poor if and only if its per capita earnings are below a pre-established poverty line. 
 We showed that a minimum wage increase can raise poverty, lower poverty, or leave 
poverty unchanged. The particular outcome depends on the specific balance between the high 
wage, the low wage, employment in high-wage and low-wage jobs, the elasticity of demand for 
labor with respect to the minimum wage, and the value of α chosen.  
Table 2 summarizes the patterns that arise depending on how high the poverty line is and 
which value of α is chosen. The fifteen cells of Table 2 reflect what happens within a case. In 
addition, minimum wage changes may be large enough to cause movements across cases. We 
proved three propositions relating to movements across cases, showing that P0 necessarily 
changes discontinuously when crossing cases and that P2  necessarily changes continuously when 
crossing cases. Furthermore, we demonstrated that there may be non-monotonicities in the 
relationship, which means that local results—theoretical or empirical—are not necessarily a good 
guide to the effects of discrete changes. 
The results derived here reinforce the general conclusion from Fields and Kanbur (2007) 
that no simple statement can be made about whether an increase in the minimum wage raises 
poverty, lowers poverty, or leaves poverty unchanged. A detailed analysis is needed before 
conclusions can be drawn. This strongly suggests that the nature of the policy debate should shift 
from the simplistic “yes” versus “no” format that is current to a more nuanced discussion of the 
precise conditions under which a minimum wage will or will not reduce poverty.  
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Table 1. 
Types of Households and Distribution of Earnings. 
 
Type of household Number of occurrences Total household 
earnings 
Household earnings 
per capita 
H1. ( ) lh YA , hx
h
l
x
x
−2  lh ww ˆ+  2
ˆ lh ww +  
H2. ( ) ll YA , )2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− )2( h
l
x
x
−  lwˆ2  lwˆ  
H3. ( ) uh YA , hx )2
1(
h
l
x
x
−−  hw  2
hw  
H4. (  ) ul YA , )2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− )21( h
l
x
x
−−  lwˆ  2
ˆ lw  
H5. ( ) lu YA , )2
1)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −−− )2( h
l
x
x
−  lwˆ  2
ˆ lw  
H6. ( ) uu YA , )2
1)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −−− )21( h
l
x
x
−−  0  0 
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Table 2. 
Summary of Results Concerning the Effect of a Minimum Wage Increase on Poverty 
as Gauged by Pα. 
 
 Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
α = 0 0ˆ >lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα  
α = 1 
 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When 1≥η  
(<1), 
0
ˆ
≥
lwd
dPα (<0). 
 
α > 1 0ˆ >lwd
dPα  
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
Note: The parameter η  is the wage elasticity of labor demand in the minimum wage 
sector. Moving from the lowest poverty line to the highest, the five cases are:  
Case 1: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwwz +<<<<<   
Case 2: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwzw +<<<<<   
Case 3: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwz
ww +<<<<<   
Case 4: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwzwww +<<<<<  
Case 5: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 z
ww
w
ww hl
l
hl <+<<<<  
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Appendix 1: Derivations of Results in Table 2 
 
A.  Case 1: 
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In this case,  and  are sufficiently high relative to z that only the households with 
both individuals unemployed are poor. The value of Pα in this case is 
lwˆ hwˆ
 
22 )
2
1)(1()0()
2
1)(1(
h
l
h
h
l
h x
xx
z
z
x
xxP −−−=
−
−−−=
α
α  . (2) 
Let us now see how Pα is affected by an increase in . We have lwˆ
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For a standard labor demand function with 0
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, (2) is always positive – that is, poverty 
always increases as the minimum wage increases.  If, furthermore, we assume a constant 
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In Case 2, the poor households are those where both individuals are unemployed or 
where only one household member is employed and that person earns the minimum wage. In this 
case, 
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The effect of a higher minimum wage is obtained to be 
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If in (5), we assume constant elasticity of labor demand as before, we have: 
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The first term in (6) can be thought of as the unemployment effect; it tells us how an increase in 
the minimum wage brings about a reduction in employment. This term may be shown to be 
always positive as follows. The expression in brackets in the first term  
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wl  for all α . This term is multiplied by a number of 
positive terms, which proves that the entire first expression is always positive. The second term in 
(6) can be thought of as the earnings effect; it tells us how an increase in the minimum wage 
affects Pα  via the gain in earnings for those employed. To sign this expression, note that in Case 
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which is positive for any positive η .  It may also be shown that when 1≥α , 0)(
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In this case, the poverty group consists of households in which both individuals are 
unemployed and those in which only one household member is employed regardless of the sector 
of employment. The extent of poverty in this case is given by 
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Differentiating (7) with respect to the level of the minimum wage yields 
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If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, equation (8) can be further manipulated 
to yield a condition in terms of η: 
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Again, the first term is the unemployment effect (which is always positive), and the second term 
is the earnings effect (which is always negative). 
 Let us look at particular values of α. It may be verified that when 0=α , for any η , 
0
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 D.  Case 4: 
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In Case 4, households in which both individuals are unemployed and in which only one 
household member is employed are below the poverty line. Moreover, if both household 
members are employed and earn the minimum wage, that household falls below the poverty line. 
On the other hand, a household with a high wage earner and a low wage earner is above the 
poverty line. This could be a possible stylization of the US labor market where about 80% of 
minimum wage earners live with a high wage earner (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg, 2000).  
The poverty measure in this case becomes: 
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Differentiating (10) with respect to  to get the effect on of increase in , lw αP lw
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If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, equation (11) can be rewritten as: 
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Again, the first term on the right hand side is the unemployment effect. which can be shown to be 
always positive. (Group the first two terms in brackets together and the third and fifth terms 
together, from which we can see that the bracketed term is always positive.) The rest of the terms 
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of the equation form the earnings effect, which is always negative. Looking at different values of 
α, when 0=α , for any η , 0
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For Case 5, all households fall below the poverty line regardless of the employment 
status of the household members. The poverty measure can be expressed in this case as: 
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Differentiating (13) with respect to  yields lwˆ
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If the elasticity of labor demand is assumed constant, (14) can be rewritten as: 
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 (15) 
Again, we have the unemployment effect (always positive) in the first term of the right hand side 
of the equation and the earnings effect (always negative) in the rest of the equation. 
Analyzing (15) for specific values of α, when 0=α , for any η , 0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα . This is 
because everyone is under the poverty line, and that does not change as  increases. lwˆ
When 1=α , it is straightforward to show that for 1)(<≥η ,  0)(
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dPα . Finally, for 1>α , we 
have the condition that: 
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Appendix 2: Proofs of Propositions 1-3 
 
Proposition 1 
 
Proof:  
1.a) From (6), 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα within Case 2. 
1.b) From (3), 0
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dPα  within Case 1. 
1.c) The boundary between Cases 2 and 1 occurs at .2ˆ zwl =  From (4), 
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in Case 1. Because (16) > (17), P0 falls discontinuously at zwl 2ˆ = . 
Combining results 1.a-c), Proposition 1 is proved. || 
 
 
Proposition 2 
 
Proof:  
2.a) From (15), 0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα  within Case 5. 
2.b) From (12), 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  within Case 4. 
2.c) From (9), 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα within Case 3. 
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2.d) The boundary between Cases 5 and 4 occurs at .ˆ2ˆ hl wzw −=  From (13), 
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 (19) 
in Case 4. Because (18) > (19), P0 falls discontinuously at hl wzw ˆ2ˆ −= . 
2.e) The boundary between Cases 4 and 3 occurs at .ˆ zwl =  From (10), 
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 in Case 3. Evaluated at  and setting α = 0,  zwl =ˆ
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in Case 3. Because (19) > (20), P0 falls discontinuously at hl wzw −= 2ˆ . 
Combining results 2.a-e), Proposition 2 is proved. | 
 
Proposition 3 
 
Proof for 
2
hwz < :  
The continuity of P2 within each case is evident. As for the boundary, the dividing line 
between Cases 2 and 1 occurs at .2ˆ zwl =  From (4), 
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2, which is identical to what P2 equals in Case 1 at that point. Continuity is thereby proved. || 
 
Proof for 
2
hwz > :  
4.a-c) The continuity of P2 within each case follows exactly as in 2.a-c).  
4.d) The boundary between Cases 5 and 4 occurs at .ˆ2ˆ hl wzw −=  From (13), 
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 in Case 4. Evaluated at and setting α = 2, hl wzw ˆ2ˆ −=
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 in Case 4. These are identical, and therefore P2 is continuous at the boundary between Cases 5 
and 4. 
4.e) The boundary between Cases 4 and 3 occurs at .ˆ zwl =  From (10), 
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Case 3. These are identical, and therefore P2 is continuous at the boundary between Cases 4 and 3. 
Combining results 4.a-e), Proposition 4 is proved. || 
 
 
